The analysis of this paper demonstrates that when the Phillips curve has forward-looking components, a goal for average inflation-i.e., targeting a j-period average of one-period inflation rates-will cause inflation expectations to change in a way that improves the short-run trade-off faced by the monetary policymaker. Average inflation targeting is thus an example of a "modified" loss function, which when implemented in a discretionary fashion results in more efficient outcomes from the standpoint of the true social objective (inflation targeting under commitment), than the discretionary pursuit of the true objective itself. In purely forward-looking models, average inflation targeting is dominated by price level targeting. But we also demonstrate in a micro-founded model where the Phillips curve has both forward-and backward-looking components that there are cases when the average inflation target provides more efficient outcomes than both "ordinary" one-period inflation targeting and price level targeting.
The past decade has seen a substantial reduction in inflation rates in the industrialized world. While the average annual rate of inflation among the 11 major industrialized countries was over 7.5% in 1973-87, it fell to below 3% in 1988-99. 1 With this reduction in inflation rates, the meaning of "price stability" has changed. During the high-inflation period, the strive for price stability most often meant simply an attempt to curtail the rate of increase in the price level. A stable price level was considered unattainable (and thus its desirability was not debated either). Now, in a low-inflation environment, calls for price stability increasingly mean exactly that, i.e., a stable level of prices. Recent years has thus seen a renewed interest in the analysis of monetary policy geared towards achieving a stable level of prices. One strand of the literature has shed new light on the question of the relative merits of price level targeting and inflation targeting (see e.g., Dittmar and Gavin, 2000 , Kiley, 1998 , Svensson, 1999 , Vestin, 2003 . It has been demonstrated that a price level target can give a more favorable combination of variability in inflation and the output gap than an inflation targeting policy, when the central bank is constrained to act under discretion. The basic reason behind this result is that a price level target will cause inflation expectations to change in such a way as to help the monetary policy maker, the result being that policy does not have to react as strongly as otherwise. More formally, price level targeting introduces history dependence, which is a characteristic of commitment solutions as shown by Woodford (1999b) .
In this paper we investigate a set of policies that, as we argue below, may be considered as lying between price level targeting and inflation targeting, namely average inflation targeting. By this we mean a policy where the central bank's objective is to keep average inflation measured over several years stable. There are several reasons why we believe this may be interesting. First, average inflation targeting also introduces history dependence, but to a varying degree, depending on the width of the window used when calculating the average inflation rate (see Nessén 2002) . Therefore, it is of theoretical interest to see if average inflation targeting under discretion produces policy responses closer to the optimal, commitment responses. Second, since there is (at least) one central bank pursuing an average inflation target, the Reserve Bank of Australia, such a policy deserves to be analyzed. 2 The results of the paper are the following. Most importantly, we show that a target for average inflation causes inflation expectations to change in such a way that the short-run trade-off faced by the monetary policymaker improves. This in turn leads to smoother policy responses and lower societal welfare losses. Thus, given the assumption that the optimal commitment solution cannot be achieved (e.g., due to institutional constraints), average inflation targeting is an example of a "modified" loss function, which when pursued in a discretionary setting produces more efficient outcomes than the discretionary pursuit of the true objective.
3 In a purely forwardlooking model, such average inflation targets are more efficient than targets for the one-period inflation rate. But they are dominated by a price level target (i.e., the price level targeting case comes closer to the optimal commitment solution). However, we also show that in a model with both forward-and backward-looking components the relative merits of price level targets, inflation targets, and average inflation targets can change dramatically. In particular, we demonstrate that as the economy becomes more backward-looking, there are intermediate cases when an average inflation target provides more efficient outcomes than both a price level target and an ordinary one-period inflation target. We also show that the optimal width of the window used when calculating the average inflation rate becomes smaller as the importance of forward-looking behavior in the economy falls.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 1 we discuss societal preferences and different alternatives for the loss function assigned to the central bank. In Section 2 we compare the properties of price-level targeting, inflation targeting, and average inflation targeting in a very simple, completely forwardlooking model of the economy. Analytical and numerical solutions are provided here. Section 3 repeats the analysis in a model where the Phillips curve has both backward-looking and forward-looking components. This section relies on numerical solutions and the relative performance of the different delegated targeting regimes is evaluated using the theoretically correct welfare measure throughout the analysis. The final section concludes. Most of the mathematical derivations have been put in Appendix A.
SOCIETAL PREFERENCES, COMMITMENT, AND DELEGATION TO THE CENTRAL BANK
Let society's preferences be modeled as
where π t is the inflation between periods t Ϫ 1 and t (i.e., p t Ϫ p tϪ1 , where p t is the logarithm of the price level), x t is the output gap at time t, and β is a discount factor (0 Ͻ β ≤ 1). Consider the case when the society period loss function is defined as
with λ * being the true relative weight that society places on output stabilization versus inflation stabilization. Loss functions of this form are very common in analyses of monetary policy, since they are seen as capturing the salient features of inflation targeting regimes: inflation is stabilized around a target π * , while output is stabilized around the natural level; the deviations of inflation and output from their respective targets are squared, making deviations equally undesirable regardless of sign (i.e., the inflation and output targets are symmetric). Such loss functions have habitually been introduced into models of optimal monetary policy in an ad hoc manner. But as shown by Woodford (1999a) , Equation (2) can be obtained as a second-order Taylor series approximation to the expected utility level of the representative household in a theoretical model of the sort used in Section 2 of this paper, i.e., it is an approximation of the theoretically correct welfare measure in that model. (In Section 3 of this paper we use an alternative societal period loss function derived by Steinsson (2003) for an economy where a fraction of the firms sets prices according to a rule of thumb.) A critical assumption in the analysis of optimal monetary policy is whether or not the central bank can act under commitment. A famous result due to Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) is that an inflation bias may arise if the central bank has a goal for output in excess of the natural level and is unable to commit to future paths of policy. More recent results regarding monetary policy in forward-looking models (the kind of models analyzed in this paper) stress that a so-called stabilization bias may arise, independent of the central bank's output goal (see Backus and Driffil, 1986 , Currie and Levine, 1993 , Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 1999 , Woodford, 1999a , 1999b , 2000 . What this means is that the short-run response of monetary policy to shocks will also differ depending upon whether the central bank acts under commitment or discretion. Under commitment, a central bank can benefit today from the anticipation of future policy actions. Thus, a solution under commitment gives the socially optimal outcome in the sense of producing the lowest discounted sum of losses; the discretionary solution will result in a higher overall loss (see Woodford 1999b for a further discussion).
In this paper we follow the literature on strategic delegation (see e.g., Persson and Tabellini 1993) . We assume that the central bank is unable to commit to policy promises, such as rules, but is able to commit to a policy framework, such as inflation targeting. Thus, by assumption, only discretionary policies belong to the set of feasible policies. However, we calculate the commitment solution as a benchmark against which feasible alternatives are compared. In that calculation we use λ * , since there is no incentive to deviate from the social welfare function when there is no credibility problem. The question we subsequently study can be posed in the following manner. In the absence of a commitment technology, can the discretionary solution be improved upon by delegating a different mandate, i.e., a "modified" loss function, to an independent central bank?
More specifically, we envision the central bank as being assigned the task of minimizing the infinite discounted sum of period loss functions
where β is the same discount factor as before and i t is the central bank instrument (to be defined) at time t. The question is, how should society design the mandate that it delegates to the central bank, i.e., what should period loss function L t be?
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One candidate is perhaps Equation (2), i.e., the central bank is instructed to target the annual inflation rate. But as already discussed, it is the suboptimal properties 4. The maintained assumption throughout is that the delegation of this loss function is perfectly credible. It is only with regard to the implementation of a given loss function that credibility issues arise. of the solution generated under this loss function that motivates the search for another, "modified" loss function. Another possible candidate, one which has received much attention in the recent literature, is a price level target:
where λ is the relative weight on output stabilization versus price level stabilization (see the references mentioned in the Introduction). In this paper we examine these two alternatives, i.e., inflation targeting and price level targeting, plus a spectrum of "intermediate" regimes. These intermediate regimes correspond to the central bank being instructed to target the j-period average inflation rate:
where the preference parameter λ j is the relative weight on output stabilization versus j-period average inflation stabilization, the average inflation rate π j,t being defined as
In what way may average inflation targeting be seen as a sequence of intermediate regimes, lying in between inflation targeting and price level targeting? If we let j ϭ 1 in Equation (6) then we of course have the "conventional", one-period inflation target. Further, the price level at any point in time may be expressed as the sum of the history of inflation rates plus an initial price level, or
Thus, letting j become very large in Equation (6) corresponds roughly (up to a proportionality factor) to having a price level target. 
A SIMPLE FORWARD-LOOKING MODEL
We begin by examining the relative properties of policies implied by the different loss functions (Equations 2, 4, and 5) in a very simple economy, consisting of what is commonly referred to as a "New-Keynesian" Phillips curve linking the inflation rate π t to the output gap x t and expected future inflation π tϩ1|t :
5. There are other ways of formulating the intermediate regimes. Batini and Yates (2003) and Black, Macklem, and Rose (1997) formulate the intermediate regime as a convex combination of inflation and price level targets.
6. π tϩ1|t is shorthand notation for E t (π tϩ1 ).
where u t is an exogenous shock, κ is a positive coefficient, and β is the same discount factor as before. This equation can be derived as the log-linear approximation to the first-order conditions for optimal price-setting in an economic environment with monopolistically competitive firms and sticky prices, 7 and has been analyzed extensively by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) (henceforth CGG) and Woodford (1999b) . Since prices cannot be continuously changed, firms take into consideration expectations of future marginal costs in addition to current conditions when setting their optimal price. 8 Variations in marginal costs due to variations in excess demand are captured by the term involving the output gap in Equation (7). The shock u t may be labeled a cost-push shock, since it captures everything else (other than demand conditions) that affects expected future marginal costs. We introduce a socalled exogenous persistence by letting this exogenous cost-push shock follow an AR(1) process:
where 0 ≤ ρ Ͻ 1. Typically, in analyses of monetary policy with inflation targets, an aggregate demand relation is also specified, linking the interest rate (i.e., the instrument in such models) to the output gap. For analytical simplicity, we assume that the output gap, x t , is the instrument of the central bank. Nonetheless, analytical solutions are only available for a subset of the spectrum of loss functions examined in this paper.
9 Therefore, in Section 2.2 we use numerical solutions for a characterization of the remaining regimes. Prior to that we discuss analytical solutions for the four cases where such are available. Three of these have been derived previously elsewhere. The new result pertains to the case when the target is a two-period average (i.e., j ϭ 2). We show in the following that delegating such a target to the central bank produces outcomes that are more efficient than the outcomes produced by adherence to an "ordinary" one-period inflation target.
Analytic solutions
In this section, we report optimal policy for (1) inflation targeting under commitment and three discretion cases: when the central bank is assigned (2) a price level target, (3) an inflation target where the inflation rate is calculated on a "one-period" basis, and (4) a two-period average inflation rate target. The four cases will be represented on a similar form, and we introduce some notation to help keep them apart. For any coefficient x, we let the cases, in consecutive order, be denoted by x * , x, x, and x, respectively. As already mentioned, the first three cases have been solved elsewhere but we reproduce the results here for ease of comparison. In each case we pay special attention to the resulting behavior of the output gap (which in 7. More specifically, the sticky prices are modeled according to Calvo (1983) , whereby the opportunity for a firm to change its price arrives stochastically and exogenously.
8. This can be seen most clearly by iterating forward on Equation (7), as in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) .
9. A j-period moving average introduces j Ϫ 1 state variables. When j Ͼ 2 this becomes analytically intractable.
this simple scaled-down model of the economy is the control variable), the price level, and the (one-period) inflation rate, in particular their variances. We begin with the benchmark: inflation targeting under commitment.
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The "inflation-targeting-under-commitment" solution. As shown in CGG, solving Equation (1) subject to Equations (7) and (8) 
The expressions for a * , b * , c * , d * are to be found in Appendix A. Several features of this commitment solution should be noted. First, the price level is stationary (since, as shown in CGG, 0 ≤ a * ≤ 1, and it is only when the central bank has infinite concern for output stabilization that a ϭ 1). 11 Further, since c * is strictly positive, optimal policy will be characterized by prolonged responses to one-time shocks (even when ρ ϭ 0): as long as p tϪ1 remains above (below) trend, output will be kept below (above) trend. The coefficient b * ( Ͼ 0) is increasing in λ * , while d * ( Ͼ 0) is decreasing in λ * , reflecting that a greater concern for output stabilization will imply a more cautious response to shocks, the central bank allowing the shock to pass through to current inflation to a greater extent.
Price level targeting under discretion.
Consider now the situation where the central bank is assigned a price level target, as in Equation (4). In this case, Vestin (2003) shows that the output gap, the price level, and the inflation will evolve according to
The important feature of this solution is its similarities with the "inflation targeting under commitment" solution. The coefficient ã has the property that 0 ≤ ã(λ) Ͻ 1, i.e., the price level is, naturally, stationary when the objective of monetary policy is to keep it stable. And as in the case of commitment above, the coefficient c is strictly positive, meaning that x t will be below (above) trend as long as p tϪ1 is above 10. In the analysis below we will assume that the goal for inflation is zero (i.e., π * ϭ 0) or that the goal for the price level is a constant one. These assumptions are made for analytical convenience, and have no effect on the results regarding the variances of inflation and output. The interpretation does however vary somewhat depending on the target values. In the case of π * ϭ k Ͼ 0 , the variance of inflation should be interpreted as the variance of the deviation of inflation from this value. The results regarding levels, however, are of course affected, with constants being added in the case of non-zero target levels.
11. Remember our assumption of π * ϭ 0. With a positive inflation target, the price level would instead be trend-stationary.
12. The expressions for ã,b,c,d are to be found in Appendix.
(below) it. Also, the coefficient b is increasing in λ , while d is decreasing in λ , with the same interpretation as above.
Inflation targeting under discretion: one-period inflation targeting (j ϭ 1)
. If the central bank is instructed to target the one-period inflation rate as in Equation (2), CGG show that the output gap, the price level, and the inflation rate will evolve according to
The major difference compared to the two previous cases is that â ϭ 1 and ĉ ϭ 0. This means that the price level is no longer stationary; indeed, if ρ ϭ 0 , it would be a random walk. Further, ĉ ϭ 0 implies one-time responses to one-time shocks or, differently put, policy responses will be persistent only if the shocks themselves are persistent.
Inflation targeting under discretion: two-period average (j ϭ 2)
. We now come to the case when the central bank is instructed to target the two-period average inflation rate (thus j ϭ 2 in Equation (6)). This case has not been solved earlier, and the complete derivation can be found in Appendix A. There it is shown that the price level, inflation, and the output gap will evolve according to
The general form of the equations for inflation and output have changed somewhat compared to the earlier cases (e.g., p tϪ2 also appears). Now, with a goal formulated in terms of a two-period average, it should not be surprising that variables dated two periods ago affect the conduct of optimal monetary policy. A fundamental consequence of the two-period average is that bygones are no longer bygones. Consideration must be given to what "one-period" inflation was last period-if it was below the target π * , this period's inflation must be above π * in order to keep the average "close" to π * (i.e., with due consideration taken to output concerns). And, of course, lagged inflation affecting policy is the same as the price level lagged two periods affecting policy. The following can be noted about the properties of the coefficients. First, 0 ≤ ā Ͻ 1 , the consequence being that (one-period) inflation will for a time oscillate around zero following a temporary shock.
14 The reason why this is optimal is, as was just explained, that it will result in the two-year average being "close" to target 13. Ibid. 14. Numerical simulations reveal that these oscillations only arise for very small values of λ.
(the target being normalized to 0). Furthermore, the coefficient b ≥ 0 and is increasing in λ 2 , while d ≥ 0 and is decreasing in λ 2 with the same interpretation as beforethe greater the concern for real variability the more will a given shock be allowed to feed through to current inflation. Finally, the coefficient c ≥ 0 and is decreasing in λ 2 . This means that with a goal for the two-year average inflation rate, monetary policy will be characterized by persistence, even following temporary shocks. This feature of the solution is a central one, since it means that the solution exhibits history dependence.
Comparison of regimes-variance frontiers and losses.
Using the analytical solutions for the variances of output and inflation under the four regimes we have studied so far, we can compare the monetary-policy trade-offs faced in each case.
15 This is done by constructing "variance frontiers", i.e., combinations of var{π t } and var{x t } for different values of the preference parameters λ * , λ , λ , and λ 2 . Such frontiers are also called "efficient policy frontiers" since points outside the frontier are inefficient, while points inside are infeasible. Figure 1 contains the variance frontiers for the four cases where we have assumed that β ϭ 0.96, κ ϭ 0.2, and ρ ϭ 0. 16 The commitment frontier (the thin dashed line) lies closest to the origin, and is thus the most favorable one. The "j ϭ 1 under discretion" frontier (thick dashed line) is farthest to the north-east, and thus the least favorable. The price level targeting frontier (dotted line) almost coincides with the commitment frontier as was shown in Vestin (2003) . 17 The new result here pertains to the average inflation targeting case (the solid line). What we see in Figure 1 is that it constitutes an intermediate case, i.e., with a target for two-period average inflation, a better trade-off is attained than with a one-period inflation target.
The improved trade-off will in turn translate into a lower loss than under ordinary inflation targeting, regardless of λ * , the relative weight on output stabilization versus inflation stabilization in the true loss function (Equation 2). To explain this, we follow Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and rewrite the unconditional expected value of Equation (1) as
In the variance-frontier diagram, this equation describes a straight line (an "isoloss" line) with a slope equal to Ϫ 1րλ * and an intercept at the x-axis equal to L * , the loss. The procedure of finding the optimal regime (including λ) to delegate may be described as finding the point of tangency between a straight line with slope equal to Ϫ 1րλ * and the variance frontier lying closest to the origin. Since the average inflation targeting frontier lies strictly inside the inflation targeting frontier, it 15. These variances are to be found in Appendix.
16. In this section we think of this model as being an annual one. The value for κ is a simple average of the estimates obtained by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Roberts (1995) , respectively.
17. For values of ρ close to 1, the difference becomes discernable to the eye. will always (i.e., regardless of λ * ) be better to choose that regime (together with an appropriate value of λ 2 ). To explain the intuition behind the improved trade-off under average inflation targeting, note that inflation expectations, when the two-period average inflation rate is targeted, are given by
Since 0 ≤ ā ≤ 1, an inflation rate above target (the target being normalized to zero) leads to expectations of inflation being lower than target in the subsequent period, i.e., following a positive shock the two-year average target automatically generates expectations of deflation. By inspecting the Phillips relation Equation (7) it follows that the instrument x t does not have to be depressed as much since inflation expectations simultaneously fall. It is in this sense that the monetary policy maker is helped by suitably changing expectations, the result being an improved short-run monetary-policy trade-off compared with the inflation targeting ( j ϭ 1) case.
18 This 18. By Equation (11) inflation expectations when j ϭ 1 is simply π tϩ1|t ϭ bu tϩ1|t . Note that "suitably" adapting expectations also materialize in the case of a price level target. By Equation (10) it follows that inflation expectations when the central bank targets the price level are given by π tϩ1|t ϭ (ã Ϫ 1)p t ϩ bu tϩ1|t .
Since 0 ≤ ã Ͻ 1 , a positive value of p t (i.e., the price level is above target, the latter being normalized to zero) will have a dampening effect on inflation expectations.
improved short-run trade-off in turn means that the variance frontier lies closer to the origin, and closer to the commitment solution.
Impulse responses-the "stabilization bias". Another way of comparing the four regimes is with respect to their dynamic responses to temporary shocks. Figures 2  and 3 contain the dynamic responses of inflation and output to a temporary shock under the optimal commitment solution and three discretionary solutions (price level targeting, inflation targeting and average inflation targeting). 19 Again, the price level targeting outcome almost coincides with the outcome under commitment, so only three responses can be distinguished in Figures 2 and 3 . In each case the relative weight on output stabilization has been chosen optimally to minimize the true welfare function represented by Equation (13), assuming λ * ϭ 0.1. Again, the price level targeting outcome coincides with the outcome under commitment, so only three responses are discernable in the figures. Consider first the impulse responses under commitment (thin dashed line): even though the shock is temporary, the policy response in Figure 3 is persistent. The reason why this is so is that it produces deflation in the periods following the shock (see Figure 2) , expectations of which are desirable since they imply that the response today can be milder (and the overall loss smaller) (see Woodford 1999b) . In contrast, inflation targeting under discretion gives a one-time (and "large") output response to a one-time shock, and inflation is back to its pre-shock value after one period. This suboptimal response has been labeled the "stabilization bias". 20 Consider now the two cases with "modified" objective functions. With a price level target (dotted line) the policy response displays the same characteristic as the commitment case, i.e., of a persistent response, and of "undershooting" of inflation. The same applies to the two-period average case, i.e., the output response is persistent (even when the shock is not) and there is deflation after the shock (however only for one period).
Numerical solutions for higher j
As we have noted previously, we are unable to provide analytical solutions for j Ͼ 2. Instead we rely on numerical solutions for a characterization of these regimes.
The parameter values that we have used are the same as those that were used above when discussing the analytical solutions, i.e., β ϭ 0.96, κ ϭ 0.2 and ρ ϭ 0. Here we have in mind primarily an annual model, which means that our parameter values are comparable to those used in Woodford (1999b) and McCallum and Nelson (2000) .
The j ϭ 1 and j ϭ 2 cases were particularly easy to analyze since, as shown in Figure 1 , the j ϭ 2 variance frontier lies strictly inside the j ϭ 1 frontier. From this 20. See e.g., Woodford (1999b) and Söderlind (1999) . For early references on this issue, see Backus and Driffil (1986) and Currie and Levine (1993) . geometric property it was easy to show that delegating an average inflation target is always better than delegating an ordinary inflation target, regardless of what society's true preferences over inflation and output variability may be. But what happens as j increases beyond 2?
As variance frontiers corresponding to higher j's are calculated, it turns out that these begin to cross each other at tiny levels of λ j (i.e., to the north-west in a variance frontier diagram). For example, the j ϭ 3 frontier lies inside the j ϭ 2 frontier for high values of λ 2 and λ 3 (to the south-east) but then, going left along the curve, intersects the j ϭ 2 frontier from below. This means that for tiny values of λ * , it is more efficient to delegate j ϭ 2 than j ϭ 3.
The interpretation of the intersecting variance frontiers is illustrated more explicitly in Figures 4 and 5. In these figures the losses incurred under the discretionary implementation of price level targeting, inflation targeting and different cases of average inflation targeting are shown as a function of different values of delegated λ's (on the horizontal axis). The losses have been scaled by the loss incurred under commitment, the latter being set at 100. The two figures correspond to two different assumptions regarding the value of λ * , 0.005 and 0.5, respectively. First some general comments regarding the figures can be made. Each curve has a unique minimum and the corresponding λ is the optimal value to delegate for that particular regime. For example, the thin dotted line in each figure shows that a price level target can indeed replicate the commitment solution provided that an appropriate value for λ is chosen, 21 while the dashed line corresponding to j ϭ 1 attains its minimum at the true value of λ * (the two horizontal lines show the loss incurred by minimizing the social objective under commitment and discretion, respectively). This latter feature is an illustration of a result obtained in CGG: in this completely forward-looking model there is no point in appointing a conservative banker when there is no persistence in the shocks. 22 Coming back to the points made above, Figure 4 shows that when λ * ϭ 0.005 the minimum loss possible with j ϭ 2 is lower than with j ϭ 3. One could say that in this case the optimal j is 2. Figure 5 illustrates, however, that as λ * increases, the optimal j increases too. For example, when λ * ϭ 0.5 the minimum loss possible with a target for average inflation is when j ϭ 12.
Thus, the analysis in this section has shown that the optimal j will depend on λ * . In the next section, we proceed to a fully micro-founded analysis. This allows us to perform a consistent evaluation of the different regimes. Furthermore, we want to explore the implications of inflation persistence in a consistent way.
A MODEL WITH INFLATION PERSISTENCE
An important message from the analysis of the previous section is that with a forward-looking Phillips curve, the policy trade-off will improve if inflation expectations can be made to adjust in a suitable way. Earlier studies have shown that this 21. For robustness-checks with respect to credibility issues and uncertainty, see Yetman (2002) . 22. See Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999), Result 7, p. 1680. can be accomplished with a price level target. The new result in this paper is that an average inflation target will also cause inflation expectations to change in a desirable direction, i.e., in such a way that the monetary-policy trade-off is improved.
A natural question to ask now is how sensitive these results are to the particular form of the Phillips curve. The results above were obtained in a purely forwardlooking specification, where lagged inflation rates play no role in the determination of current inflation. Such specifications have been criticized on the grounds of poor empirical performance and it has been argued that lagged inflation rates must also enter the Phillips curve in order to properly account for actual inflation (see e.g., Fuhrer 1997). Such "hybrid" formulations, containing both expectations of future levels of inflation and lagged inflation, can be obtained theoretically in a number of ways. Fuhrer and Moore (1995) do so by assuming that relative real wages are set in a staggered fashion. In derivations based on optimizing behavior, Hallsten (1999) assumes quadratic price adjustment costs (thus extending results obtained by Rotemberg 1982) , while Steinsson (2003) and Amato and Laubach (2002) assume rule-of-thumb behavior on part of a subset of the firms resetting their prices.
In this section we use the model derived by Steinsson (2003) and explore the relative properties of price level targeting, inflation targeting, and average inflation targeting in the case when the Phillips curve includes lagged inflation. The core of the model has the same friction (sticky prices) and features as the model used in the previous section. The new feature is that a fraction of agents follows a rule of thumb, not fully utilizing new information, when they change their prices. This implies that inflation will be persistent, a feature many claim is important to match the data, as mentioned above. We do not take a strong stand on this issue; instead we explore the consequences of alternative assumptions for our competing policy regimes. A virtue of the micro-founded approach is that a model-consistent welfare criterion can be derived and we use this to evaluate the different targeting rules for monetary policy. For simplicity we continue to view the output gap as the control variable. The model we analyze is thus of the following form:
The parameters χ f , χ b , κ 1 , κ 2 , γ 1 , and γ 2 are functions of the structural parameters of the economy and we refer to the Steinsson paper for details. 23 It may be of interest to note that as the fraction of rule-of-thumbers approaches zero the coefficient on the forward-looking component of inflation, χ f , is equal to 1, the coefficient on the backward-looking component, χ b , approaches 0, and κ 2 ϭ 0, meaning that we then have the forward-looking model employed in Section 2. The cost-push shock 23. χ f and χ b are functions of the probability of being able to change price (α), the fraction of pricesetters that are rule-of-thumbers (ω), and the discount factor (β). κ 2 is a function of α, ω, β, and δ, the degree to which rules-of-thumbers consider demand conditions. κ 1 is a function of α, ω, β, δ plus θ (the elasticity of substitution), σ (related to the curvature of the utility function), and ψ (related to the curvature of the production function).
η t is a shock to the pricing power of firms (or equivalently, a shock to the elasticity of substitution between goods), i.e., a shock to the markup on marginal cost. The moving average structure of the shock is due to the fact that some agents respond to old information (which is why γ 1 and γ 2 are determined by the structural parameters).
The second-order Taylor-series approximation to the level of expected utility of the representative household in this economy is shown by Steinsson as being:
where the four relative weights are functions of the underlying structural parameters of the model. Comparing this loss function with the one applicable to the completely forward-looking model in Section 2 (Equation 2), we see that it is somewhat more complex. Theoretical derivations of Equation (2) (see e.g., Woodford 1999a) reveal that the output gap term enters that loss function since it is measures the disutility of consumption fluctuations. The inflation term enters since it perfectly measures (up to a second order approximation) the expected cost of the distortion present in the standard Calvo model, i.e., the dispersion in production brought on by sticky prices (which is costly due to increasing marginal costs). In the present model, where a fraction of firms follow a backward-looking rule-of-thumb, more terms are needed to capture the cost of the distortion (again, see Steinsson op. cit. for details).
Solution and evaluation of regimes
We have solved the model numerically using the same structural parameter values as reported by Steinsson. 24 The only parameter that we vary is the fraction of pricesetters that are rule-of-thumbers, denoted by ω. As noted above, this fraction in turn will determine the relative importance of expected inflation and lagged inflation in the Phillips curve. In our simulations, we vary ω between 0 and 1, which is a reflection of the lack of consensus in the empirical literature on how forward-looking the Phillips curve is.
25 Table 1 below shows how the coefficients in Equations (15)- (17) vary with ω. Table 1 shows that when the fraction of price-setters that are rule-of-thumbers increases, there are important changes both in the Phillips curve and in the parameters in the loss function. First, the importance of lagged inflation increases at the expense of the forward-looking component. Second, the relative importance of the lagged variables in the loss-function becomes more pronounced. This is due to the fact that as the number of rule-of-thumbers increases, historial values of inflation and output will play a larger role in the determination of prices.
The issue we wish to analyze now is the relative performance of different delegation schemes for different values of ω. What is the relative performance of price 24. In Steinsson's notation, these values are α ϭ 0.7, σ ϭ 5, ψ ϭ 2, θ ϭ 5, β ϭ 0.99, δ ϭ 0.052. See also previous footnote. This means that the model in this section is a quarterly model.
25. Empirical estimates of χ f include Fuhrer (1997) who could not reject that χ f ϭ 0 (although he argues that a model with some forward-looking behavior has more realistic dynamics), and Rudebusch (2002) who estimates an equation fairly similar to Equation (15) for the U.S. using quarterly data 1968:III to 1996:IV, and obtains the estimate χ f ϭ 0.29. To answer this question the following calculations have been made. For a given value of ω the first step is to calculate the social optimum, which means minimizing Equation (17) under commitment. In this step, the theory-based values of λ 1 through λ 4 are used. In the next step, the minimum losses attainable under different delegated targeting regimes are found. The delegated regimes we consider are, as in Section 2, a price level target, an inflation target, and average inflation targets, the latter for several different values of j.
26 For each regime we find the optimal λ to delegate (but note that the losses are calculated using the theory-based values of λ 1 through λ 4 ). For each regime the minimum loss is scaled by the loss incurred under the social optimum, the latter being set to 100. This procedure is then repeated for another value of ω (i.e., a new social optimum is calculated, and new minimum losses possible in each regime). As already mentioned, in our calculations we have let ω vary between 0 and 1. Figure 6 summarizes the results from these calculations. 27 Each curve corresponds to a delegated regime and shows, given a value of ω, the lowest possible loss attainable under that particular regime. Consider, for example, the case of ω ϭ 0.2. Figure 6 shows that in this case the lowest possible loss with a price level target is roughly the same as the loss that arises from minimizing the social welfare function under commitment, an average inflation target with j ϭ 12 results in a loss that is about 2% higher, and a one-period inflation target results in a loss that is approximately 25% higher.
A number of interesting observations can be made from Figure 6 . First, we note that when ω ϭ 0 the model collapses to the completely forward-looking model 26. Note that "inflation targeting" is no longer the social objective. Now, the social objective is, of course, Equation (17). We have included the outcome of the discretionary minimization of Equation (17) in our analysis below.
27. In Figure 6 , only a subset of the average inflation target regimes that we have analyzed are included, for obvious reasons. analyzed in Section 2, and the results obtained here are the same as reported in that section. Thus, price-level targeting is the best regime in terms of providing lowest possible loss and it is in fact possible to replicate the commitment solution. An average inflation target does better than an ordinary one-period inflation target, and the optimal j is 12.
Second, and most importantly, the relative performance of the different regimes change as ω increases. Figure 6 shows that price level targeting remains the superior delegation scheme until ω ≈ 0.43. From this point on until ω ≈ 0.68 different average inflation targets provide the lowest possible loss, beginning with j ϭ 9 and then proceeding with smaller values of j. 28 These particular values are, of course, only indicative since they will depend on e.g., the accuracy of the numerical methods used and assumptions made regarding parameter values, but they are useful for illustrating a main result in this section, namely that the optimal j is decreasing in 28. This is hard to see in Figure 6 , where we have restricted the number of average inflation targeting regimes. From more detailed calculations we know that when ω is between approximately 0.43 and 0.53 an average inflation target with j ϭ 9 provides the lowest loss, followed by j ϭ 8 until ω ≈ 0.59, j ϭ 7 until ω ≈ 0.64, j ϭ 6 until ω ≈ 0.65, and j ϭ 5 until ω ≈ 0.68. After that point j ϭ 1 provides the lowest loss until ω ≈ 0.83 after which the discretionary implementation of the social welfare function gives the lowest loss. ω, i.e., the less forward-looking that the economy is, the shorter should the period over which average inflation is calculated be.
Third, when ω approaches 1 price level targeting is the worst regime, while the discretionary implementation of the social welfare objective delivers the lowest loss. This is because when ω is large the weights on the third, fourth, and fifth terms in the welfare criterion become relatively more important and none of our simple regimes can satisfactorily capture the way optimal policy responds in these circumstances.
How can these results be understood? Why is it that e.g., price level targeting goes from being the superior delegation scheme to the worst, as ω increases from 0 to 1? In Section 2 we explained how the beneficial properties of a price level target or an average inflation target, i.e., the suitably adjusting inflation expectations, lead to an improved monetary policy trade-off and lower welfare loss in the completely forward-looking model. In the model used in this section, as ω increases and the economy becomes less forward-looking expectations naturally play a smaller role in the determination of current inflation. The classic intuition for why price level targeting is bad is that it creates unwanted excessive variability in output as the central bank brings the price level back to its steady state path. In the completely backward-looking model this is indeed true and no benefit comes from the stabilizing effect on expected future inflation (since these play no role in the economy). In the intermediary cases, there is a trade-off and the precise parameter values determine when the positive effect starts to dominate as ω decreases.
One final observation can be made regarding Figure 6 . While the relative performance of all delegated regimes vary depending on the value of ω, some regimes appear to be less sensitive to "reasonable" variations in ω. By this we mean that it is difficult to assume that ω is close to 1, since it would imply that almost all firms fail to incorporate new information when re-setting their prices. So if we limit our attention to values of ω that lie between 0 and 0.85, we see that pursuing an average inflation target with, say, j ϭ 6, delivers outcomes that are at most 10% worse than the commitment solution.
To end this section, the relative merits of price level targeting, inflation targeting, and average inflation targeting depend critically on the importance of forwardlooking behavior in the Phillips curve. In purely forward-looking specifications of the Phillips curve, price level targeting provides the most favorable outcome. But as the importance of expected inflation diminishes price level targeting begins to perform more poorly, while the relative performance of different average inflation targets begin to improve. Finally, when the economy is very backward-looking, the discretionary minimization of the social welfare objective in Equation (17) dominates all the examined alternatives, as none of the equilibria under these policies captures the features of the optimal equilibria. To summarize the points for average inflation targeting, (1) there is an intermediate range of ω (and thus for χ f ) for which an average inflation target dominates all other regimes and (2) there are values of j (the period over which average inflation is measured) that work reasonably well for a wide range of ω.
CONCLUSIONS
Recent research has shown that when forward-looking behavior is important in the economy, optimal monetary policy is inertial. In other words, optimal policy responses are characterized by persistence, even in the wake of purely temporary shocks. These optimal solutions, obtained under commitment, are thus said to exhibit history dependence.
This paper belongs to a line of research that asks what can be done if commitment is not possible, inspired by strategic delegation. We ask how society should design the mandate delegated to, and implemented (in a discretionary fashion) by an independent central bank. Previous work has established that in the purely forward-looking model, a price level target will provide more efficient outcomes than an inflation target, and can even replicate the commitment solution. In this paper we examine further another set of policies, average inflation targeting, whereby the central bank is instructed to minimize a quadratic function in the output gap and average inflation measured over j periods. We examine the relative performance of these regimes first in a completely forward-looking model, since analytical solutions can then be provided for some values of j. Next, we use a hybrid model where inflation is determined both by forward-looking and backward-looking terms, and we solve numerically for a benchmark calibration. Note that in this hybrid model the evaluation is done using the theoretically correct welfare function.
The results of this analysis show that when the Phillips curve has forward-looking components, a goal for average inflation will often provide better outcomes (i.e., lower loss) than a "conventional" one-period inflation target. The basic mechanism behind this result is that average inflation targeting introduces history dependence which interacts favorably with expectations of future inflation. For example, with a target for two-period average inflation, a positive shock to inflation in one period will lead to expectations of lower-than-target inflation in the following period. And when the Phillips curve is forward-looking, this change in expectations will improve the short-run trade-off faced by the monetary policymaker and lead to lower societal loss.
In purely forward-looking models (or more specifically models in which lagged inflation rates have no role in the determination of current inflation) average inflation targeting is dominated by price level targeting. But we show that as the importance of forward-looking behavior in the Phillips curve falls the relative performance of price level targeting begins to deteriorate. Instead, average inflation targeting becomes the best mandate to delegate for a while, where the optimal j falls as the economy becomes more backward-looking. Finally, when the economy is very backward-looking, the discretionary minimization of the social welfare objective delivers the lowest loss.
Thus, the relative merits of price level targeting, inflation targeting, and average inflation targeting depend critically on the structural parameters of the economy in general and more specifically on the degree of persistence in the Phillips curve. Needless to say, theoretical and empirical work on these factors remains an important task.
APPENDIX A: ANALYTICAL SOLUTIONS IN THE FORWARD-LOOKING MODEL

A.1 Inflation targeting under commitment and under discretion
As shown in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) , solving Equation (1) subject to Equations (7) and (8) under commitment results in
where the coefficients are defined by
The variances of the output gap and the inflation rate are var{π t } |inflation target ϭ e * var{u t },
The discretion solution is given by
where
The variances of the output gap and the inflation rate are particularly straightforward to derive:
A.2 Price level targeting under discretion
This case is solved in Vestin (2003) to which we refer for details. The solution is the output gap, the price level and inflation will evolve according to
where the coefficient ã is defined by
(λ being the relative weight on output stabilization versus price level stabilization) and the remaining coefficients b,c, and d are defined by
With a price level target the variances of the output gap and the inflation rate are
A.3 Two period average target under discretion
The analytical solution for the case of a two-period average in the loss function is obtained in the following manner. The value function is
where λ 2 is the relative weight on output stabilization versus two-period average inflation stabilization. The state variable will follow a linear path (which follows from the fact that a quadratic loss function implies that the control variable will be a linear function of the state variables), i.e., π tϩ1 ϭ a tϩ1 π t ϩ b tϩ1 u tϩ1 , which implies π tϩ1|t ϭ a tϩ1 π t ϩ b tϩ1 ρu t .
Substitute Equation (A5) into Equation (A4) and solve for x t :
Solving for π t we obtain π t ϭ κ 1 Ϫ βa tϩ1 x t ϩ 1 ϩ βρb tϩ1 1 Ϫ βa tϩ1 u t .
The first order condition for the optimization problem is: (1 ϩ β(1 ϩ a tϩ1 )) ϩ 4λ 2 (1 Ϫ βa tϩ1 ) 2 u t .
Since π t ϭ a t π tϪ1 ϩ b t u t , we arrive at
(1 ϩ β(1 ϩ a tϩ1 )) ϩ 4λ 2 (1 Ϫ βa tϩ1 ) 2 , i.e., two equations that define a simultaneous recursion for a and b. The stationary solutions will then imply π t ϭ aπ tϪ1 ϩ bu t .
In order to compare this solution with the other cases, it is convenient to define (ā Ϫ 1) ≡ a. Thus we will use π t ϭ (ā Ϫ 1)π tϪ1 ϩ bu t .
To get an expression for x t , use Equation (A6):
A.4 Variances
To find the variance of inflation, note that
Since cov{π tϪ1 ,u t } ϭ cov{(ā Ϫ 1)π tϪ2 ϩ bu tϪ1 ,ρu tϪ1 ϩ ε t } ϭ (ā Ϫ 1)ρ cov{π tϪ2 ,u tϪ1 } ϩ bρ var{u t } , we get cov{π tϪ1 ,u t } ϭ bρ 1 Ϫ āρ ϩ ρ var{u t } , due to stationarity. Thus
Next, to find the variance of output, note that
(1 Ϫ āρ ϩ ρ) ]
